What is the relative importance of factors influencing teenage pregnancy or global warming? How should corporate costs or profits be allocated? And what is the relative importance of assets in an investment portfolio? This paper presents an economic theory of attribution capable of addressing these questions that is based on the general question: "What is the probability that any order of model factors is correctly ordered by their relative importance?" Elementary axioms identify two probability distributions over factor orders. In proportional marginal attribution (P M A), a factor's expected contribution share is equal the probability it is most important. In linear attribution (LA) all orders are equally likely.
This work is based on and contributes to cooperative game theory, a mathematical approach to the study of bargaining. Cooperative game theory provides models for the representation of the joint effects inherent in bargaining and methods for their attribution. The simplest n-person bargaining game provides a sturdy but limited model of bargaining, yet a perfect structure for the attribution problems studied here.
von Neumann (1928 Neumann ( /1952 first defines the n-person cooperative game. The Shapley (1953) value is today the central solution concept. A versatile axiomatically defined mathematical structure, it is also the equilibrium outcome of noncooperative bargaining games such as Gull (1988) and Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) . It and its generalization to games with a continuum of players, the Aumann-Shapley (1974) value, have been applied to diverse problems, including cost allocation (e.g., Shubik (1962) and Young (1985) ), general equilibrium (e.g., Shapley (1964) ), and price setting (e.g., Billera and Heath (1982) ). Roth (1988) and Hart (2006) provide reviews. Shapley (1953) shows his value represents the expected marginal contributions of players to a growing coalition when all orders of "arrival" are equally likely. Weber (1988) characterizes the set of all linear random order values. A significant literature has developed (e.g., Khmelnitskya (1999) and Segal (2003) ). Linearity, however, prevents the worths of coalitions from influencing the random order arrival process.
Consistency in cooperative games has been based on special games that "reduce" players from an initial game. If a solution concept is consistent, allocations to the remaining players are unchanged. Hart and Mas-Colell (1988) define a reduced game and use it to characterize the Shapley value with consistency. Feldman (1999 Feldman ( , 2002 shows parallel results for the proportional value using the same reduced game.
Random order consistency requires that an inert player or factor, one having no joint effects with others, not disturb the probabilities of suborders in which it is not included. The random order approach to consistency does not require a reduced game. This facilitates practical application. Random order consistency is shown to provide a simple and powerful expectations-based approach to cooperative value.
The proportional value (Ortmann (2000) and Feldman (1999 Feldman ( , 2002 ) satisfies a proportional gain rule instead of the balanced (equal) contributions rule of Myerson (1980) and is defined by a ratio potential rather than the linear Hart and Mas-Colell (1988) potential. Feldman (2002) shows the proportional value induces a random order process influenced by coalitional worths and that it is the equilibrium outcome of a noncooperative bargaining game where players' probabilities of proposing are proportional to their expected payoff. Khmelnitskya and Driessen (2001) and Calvo and Driessen (2003) study generalizations.
Section 1 of this paper presents a microeconomic model of relative importance based on set marginal contributions in a random order model. Random order consistency and other axioms are used to directly identify a probability distribution over orders. The Shapley and proportional values are identified in a common framework, without assuming linearity or proportionality, though the change of a single axiom.
Section 2 defines restricted potentials and obtains proportional value derivatives and coalition formation results. The proportional value is shown not converse monotonic. A family of values including the Shapley and proportional values is shown. * * * Attribution involves a single monotonic utility function. Players in the corresponding bargaining problem must be assumed to have identical linear utility functions. In attribution, factors and factor sets replace players and coalitions. The worth of a factor set is based on the utility resulting from the presence of its factors or the restriction of utility maximization to the variation of its factors. Three examples demonstrate the potential of this theory of attribution.
Statistical tests ignore joint effects by design. Linear attribution of OLS R 2 as a measure of relative importance is proposed by Hoffman (1960) , Lindeman, et al. (1980) , Kruskal (1987) and Chevan and Sutherland (1991) . McNally (2000) initiates its use in ecology studies. Soofi, et al. (2000) develop a model of linear attribution in categorical analysis. Linear attribution of model R 2 allows a factor to appear important due only to correlations with factors in the true model. Feldman (2005a) first proposes an exclusion axiom which requires that such a factor receive zero attribution share, and with other axioms, characterizes proportional marginal attribution of model R 2 (there called proportional marginal variance decomposition or PMVD). Grömping (2006 Grömping ( , 2007 provides attribution tools and studies OLS LA and PMA.
Section 3 studies econometric attribution. The model objective function is considered to be the utility function of an analyst. Random order consistency is found compatible with econometric attribution. Attributions are found stable and comparable across a variety models based on data from Fair (1977) . PMA identifies factor relative importance and model relationships missed by joint significance tests.
Section 4 considers utility attribution in microeconomic models more generally. Random order consistency is found to be an acceptable axiom whenever an attribution problem can be composed with an independent problem. A portfolio optimization example illustrates utility attribution in a typical microeconomic context. The example provides methods for evaluating the relative importance of assets in an investor's portfolio and the per-dollar contributions of assets to investor utility.
Section 5 considers cost allocation as an attribution problem. Random order consistency is found to be an appropriate axiom for cost attribution. An example illustrates the relative vulnerability of LA to strategic definition of cost centers.
The conclusion summarizes, compares random order and reduced game consistency and considers the common assumption that proportional solutions are translation dependent in the light of results of developed here. Extended proofs follow.
1 Basic results
General framework
Transferrable utility (TU) games represent the worth of a coalition by a single number. Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the players or factors. A standard TU game v is a map v : 2 N → R + ∪ 0 from all S ⊆ N to the nonnegative real numbers, with v(∅) ≡ 0. The S ⊆ N are coalitions or factor sets. Letī = {i} and12 = {1, 2}. Set subtraction ofī from S is written S \ī. Games are assumed weakly monotonic: v(S ∪ī) ≥ v(S).
In an attribution problem, v(S) is the expected utility of a single decision maker. If S represents binary characteristics, then v(S) is the utility resulting from the joint presence of the factors.
1 Factor set S may instead provide the decision maker with decision space ∆ S , with σ S ∈ ∆ S being a possible choice. Then v(S) is the maximum
where the null utility U (∅) represents the utility obtained when there are no optimization choices. The null utility is the basis point of Feldman (2005b) . It is clearly needed with exponential and other utility functions that can generate negative utility. Its importance in other circumstances will become apparent.
The weak monotonicity of v corresponds to the assumption that maximization over a greater number of factors cannot result in a decline in expected utility.
The dual game to v represents the marginal contributions of all coalitions or factor sets. The dual worth w(S) is v(N ) minus the worth of the complement of S:
(2)
The random order model
Attribution is based on a random order model of relative importance. A discrete marginality replaces the more typical economic focus on continuous marginal conditions. In this model factors "arrive," one at time, to join a growing factor set. Factors could be indexed by arrival order. However, due to the central role of joint marginal contributions, it is simpler to consider the "last to arrive" as the first in an order. The last to arrive can instead be thought of as "first to leave."
An order r = (r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r n ) is a permutation of the factors (or players) of N . The set of all orders of N is R(N ). Define S r k = {r 1 , . . . , r k } to be the set (coalition) of the first k factors (players) in the order r. These are the last k factors to arrive in order r. If S has k factors, S is included in r, written S ∈ r, if and only if S = S r k . Thus w(S r i ) is the joint marginal contribution of the last i factors to enter. Let r(i) be the position of i in order r, so that r r(i) = i. When factors are ordered according to relative importance, r 1 is least important and r n is most important.
Let r S be an order of the factors of a set S N and consider an r ∈ R(N ). Assume that for any i and j in S such that r S (i) > r S (j), it is also true that r(i) > r(j). The order of the factors in r S is preserved in r, so r S is a suborder of r, written r S ⊂ r. Also, r is a superorder of r S , written r ⊃ r S .
Let m P (r) be an n-vector of positional marginal contributions defined by r. Element i, m P i (r), represents the marginal contribution of the factor in position i in r. This quantity is defined as follows with respect to the dual game:
where S r 0 = ∅ and w(∅) = 0. Let m S (r) be the n-vector of set marginal contributions:
The probability p(r) that any order r ∈ R(N ) is the realized order of arrivals is defined by a likelihood function L(r) with L(r) ≥ 0 for all r:
The expected utility contribution of factor i with respect to distribution p is then
Axioms and the fundamental theorem
Axioms are used to identify probability distributions over orderings and not the value function itself. Such a distribution may be understood to represent the probability that any order is correctly ordered by the relative importance of its factors.
A factor z is inert if and only if it adds exactly its own non-zero worth to every coalition: v(z) > 0 and, for any S ⊆ N \z, v(S ∪z) = v(S) + v(z). Let v * be the game created by adding a set of inert factors Z, so that N * = N ∪ Z.
Random order consistency requires that an inert factor or factor set have no effect on the probability of any suborder of the remaining factors. Consider an order r in R(N ). Then the sum of the probabilities of all orders r * ∈ R(N * ) such that r ⊂ r * relative to the game v * must equal the probability of r relative to v.
If the axiom holds for a likelihood L in games of cardinalities m and n, then L is random order consistent between these cardinalities. If L is random order consistent, then it is random order consistent between all cardinalities m and n, 2 ≤ m < n.
Compared to Hart and Mas-Colell (1988) reduced game consistency, random order consistency requires the existence of inert factors, but does not require a reduced game or directly constrain value allocation when inert factors are not present. 
Assume z makes zero final marginal contribution (arriving last in any order r) and all other factors make positive final marginal contributions. Exclusion then requires that only orders where z arrives last are assigned positive probability.
The basic idea of exclusion is that a factor making zero final marginal contribution should receive no attribution share. This outcome, however, is not demanded when there are two or more such factors (cf., Feldman (2002) , Section 6.1). Exclusion will considered in the limit as marginal contributions grow small. Let v 0 be strictly monotonic. Define a sequence of games
Separability requires the likelihood function be a sum or product of subliklihoods. Separability limits complexity but does not imply separability of p or φ.
Anonymity requires L(r) depend only on the marginal contributions of the factor sets included in r.
Inclusion requires that if a factor makes a positive positional contribution in any order r that there must be an order r * with positive probability in which the factor also makes a positive positional contribution. It could be that r * = r.
The following result is proved in the next two subsections. (Moulin and Shenker, 1992) , fixed proportions, path methods (Friedman, 2004) , dictatorial and priority rules (see Leroux (2006) for further discussion). An additional complication of the reduced game approach is still other solutions are consistent with respect to other reduced games.
Relative importance likelihood functions
A likelihood L is exogenous if it is independent of v, i.e., ∂L(r)/∂v(S) = 0 for all r ∈ R(N ) and S ⊆ N . If L is not exogenous, it is endogenous. Random order consistency, anonymity and inclusion identify a unique exogenous likelihood. Random order consistency, separability and exclusion identify a unique endogenous likelihood. Proof: L * (r) is anonymous and p(r) = 1/n! for any L * = c > 0. It is inclusive since for all r, p(r) > 0. It is random order consistent since for any r 0 in N \z, where z is inert,
Inclusion is necessary since L ⋄ satisfies anonymity and random order consistency. Random order consistency is necessary because many likelihoods satisfy anonymity and inclusion, e.g.,
It is sufficient to show the necessity of anonymity when n ≤ 3: Let l 1, 2)). (This is the weight system of the weighted Shapley value, cf., e.g., Kalai and Samet (1987) .) Thus, L ω is random order consistent for m = 2 and n = 3 and anonymity is necessary. Let l * Proof: L * cannot satisfy exclusion as p(r) > 0 for all r ∈ R(N ). L ⋄ satisfies exclusion. To see, consider an dual attribution problem w 0 where the final marginal contribution of z is very small and a sequence of games {w t } ∞ t=1 , where lim t→∞ w t (z) = 0; but for all other sets S ⊆ N ,
A non-anonymous exogenous L could assign an r ∈ R(N ) zero probability, but exclusion would not be satisfied. 
Attribution and value
The Shapley values of v and its dual w are equal and are the expectation when L * is used in (6). Thus Lemma 1.2 proves Shapley (1953) 
values might be identified by random order consistency and inclusion (as suggested in the proof of Lemma 1.2).
Define the function P (S) for any S ⊆ N as
P (N ) is then the normalizing factor that relates L ⋄ to the implied distribution p ⋄ :
Feldman (2002), Lemma 2.1 shows that formula (7) is one form of the ratio potential of a cooperative game and that P (S) is also recursively defined by the formula
Substitution of formula (8) into the expectation (6) gives
. This is proved in Appendix B (Sec. 7.2) and by Feldman (2002) , Lemma 2.9.
.
The discrete derivative of the ratio potential with respect to i is one definition of i's proportional value (Feldman (1999) equation ( 2 Properties of the proportional value
Elementary properties
Random order consistency directly implies the following lemma, where ϕ(v, S) is the proportional value of v when v is limited to the factors in S. (2)w (12) w(1) + w(2) , so that (2) w (12). (11) Myerson (1980) shows the Shapley value is defined by balanced contributions:
Adding j to S helps i in the same measure that adding i helps j. Ortmann (2000), Theorem 2.6 characterizes the proportional value with an analogous ratio perserving condition (called equal proportional gain in Feldman (1999 and 2002) ):
Lemma 2.2 Let v be a cooperative game with n players and requireĉ > 0.
Proof: The Shapley results are obvious. Proportional value results follow directly from formulas (7) or (9) and Corollary 1.1. 
The probability of being most important Lemma 2.3 The probability that factor i is most important in a proportional marginal attribution is ϕ i (w)/w(N ).
Proof: The probability of i being most important in a PMA implies arriving first in the random order model of relative importance. This also implies being in position n and that worths are relative to the dual game w. Thus
The first line above follows from formula (8), The substitution on the second line follows from factoring out w(N ) and applying Lemma (1.4).
Your enemy's enemy may be your friend
Feldman (1999), Lemma 3.5, shows the proportional value is monotonic. It is shown here the proportional value is not converse monotonic. The value of i can increase with an increase in the worth of S even if i ∈ S.
The restriction of a game v by a coalition S * includes only coalitions T S * that include S * as a proper subset. Let RP (S * , S) be the restricted potential for S in v restricted by S * . Define RP (S * , S * ) = 1 and define RP as in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.4 For any
The first part of the equivalence is the definition. The proof of the second equivalence is by recursive substitution, as in Feldman (2002), Lemma 2.1. The value of a player i ∈ S * in the game v restricted by
Lemma 2.5 The derivative of ϕ i (v) with the worth of any coalition S * ⊂ N is
Proof: The result follows from the value of ∂P (S)/∂v(S * ) for any S : S * S ⊆ N .
The first result is from straightforward differentiation. The second result follows as the sum of products in the first is equal to [P (S
On the other hand, the sign of ∂ϕ i (v)/∂v(S * ) is not clear for an i ∈ S * . Multiplying the LHS and RHS results of Lemma 2.5 by RP (S * , N )/P (N \ī) shows i∈N ∂ϕ i (v)/∂v(S * ) = 0 and the following.
Corollary 2.2 For any
If i's value in v restricted by S * is less than in v, then ϕ is not converse monotonic. This seems possible since formula (11) shows that adding a c > 0 to all worths can reduce the value of a dominant player. The Shapley and weighted Shapley values are converse monotonic of their linearity. Table 1 presents an example that demonstrates the proportional value is not converse monotonic. In v, 1 is weakest and 3 is strongest. 2 is strong in combination with 3, but less so in combination with 1. The proportional value (ϕ), the Shapley value (Sh) and the nucleolus (N uc) all provide qualitatively similar allocations.
The game v * is a version of v modified only by increasing 1's individual worth to 10. The proportional value is not converse monotonic because 3's value is larger than in v. Further, player 1's share of value and dominance over the next largest player have both increased. This appears a plausible outcome in economic, political and military competition. The Shapley value shows similar allocations before and after, with 2 still stronger than 1. The nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969) does not change. 
Coalition formation
Simple coalition formation results are implied by Sections 2.2 and 2.3. The coalition S forms if its members all arrive before any members of N \ S. Lemma 2.3 implies the probability that i is most important and j is second most important in the random order model of relative importance is
When the probability that S forms is summed over all such orders, the sum of worth products is the restricted potential RP (S, N, w). Results change in a standard random order model based on v, where the first in an order is the first to arrive. The player arriving last is now most important. If one player has zero individual worth, this player will arrive first with probability one (and receive zero value, see Feldman (2002) , Section 6). Then the probability of S forming in v is the probability that N \ S arrive last.
Lemma 2.6 The probability of a coalition S forming in the random order model of relative importance is
where P (∅, w) ≡ 1 and RP (∅, N, w) ≡ P (N, w). The probability that S forms in a random order model of the proportional value based on v instead of its dual is N, v) .
Corollary 2.4 The derivatives of the proportional value for any member i ∈ N relative any S ⊆ N in the game v or its dual w are as follows.
This corollary results from substitution of the results of Lemma 2.6 into Lemma 2.5.
This corollary provides the intuition that the proportional value is not converse monotonic for an i with respect to S ∋ i in v when the importance of S (the probability of forming) is greater in N than in N \ī. The probability that S arrives and then i is determined by Lemma 2.6, giving the following (computationally very inefficient) representation of the proportional value in classical marginal contribution form.
Corollary 2.5 It is straightforward to show that proportional effect, exclusion and anonymity identify the following likelihood (see Feldman (2005) Sections 3.3 and 5.1)
Linear-proportional family of values
The case α = 0 is covered by Lemma 1.2. Define the normalizing factor
, and a family of probability distributions p α , indexed by α results:
The induced expectation when (14) used to generate expectation (6) is is clearly the Shapley value when α = 0 and the proportional value when α = 1. Note, however, that these are the only random order consistent members of this family and that P α (N ) is not a potential for α = 1.
Econometric attribution
An independent variable completely orthogonal to all others in an econometric model will not affect their model parameters or statistical significance levels. It is inert in the implied attribution problem. Random order consistency requires only that such a variable not affect other attributions. The theory of attribution can thus be applied to tasks such as variance and likelihood decomposition across a wide range of models. Proof: Let v and v * represent the joint log likelihoods of factors in models based on N and N * = N ∪z, respectively, with duals w and w * . Measure the joint significance of any factor set with the likelihood ratio test, which is based on their joint marginal likelihood contribution. Thus w * (S) = w(S) for all S ⊆ N \z, and v
Exclusion requires that a factor making zero final marginal contribution to model performance, when all others have positive final marginal contribution, receive zero attribution share. Such a factor will have zero statistical significance (e.g., p = 1 that β = 0). Exclusion makes attribution as closely related to statistical significance as possible given the mutual correlation of explanatory factors. Feldman (2005a) also shows PMA components can be estimated consistently, develops properties and presents examples of LA, PMA and CVD (see fn. 4, below). Feldman (2005a) and Grömping (2007) note the potentially lower level of precision of PMVD components.
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In econometric attribution the utility function (1) can be understood to belong to an analyst and to be the model objective or likelihood function. Since OLS maximizes R 2 and R 2 is set monotonic, the marginal contribution to variance or R 2 can be the basis of attribution. Measures such as adjusted R 2 , SIC and BIC cannot be used in attribution because they are not set monotonic. A further logical restriction for eligible measures is that it should be possible to use the measure to construct statistical significance tests. Such measures are more likely to be useful for the assessment of relative importance of model factors. F -tests can be constructed from R 2 values.
Indirect effects
Grömping (2007) proposes that LA should be used when interested in indirect effects. For example, if x = f (y) and y = g(z) then z will receive a zero PMA share in the attribution of x = f ′ (y, z), but will receive an LA share if x and z are directly correlated. The following is a direct implication of the Fundamental Theorem.
Corollary 3.1 Linear attribution is the only anonymous random order consistent attribution that recognizes indirect contributions to econometric model performance.
Indirect effects can also be explicitly attributed with an assumed non-simultaneous causal structure. The result is a nesting of attribution problems. Owen (1977) shows that nested games can be interpreted as a composition of random order models. 
The structure of econometric attributions
Econometric attribution is based on the model objective function to be maximized:
where Θ(S) is the objective function value when the factors in S are in the model and those in N \ S are not. Θ(∅) is the null utility of formula (1), the model objective value when not including any factors in N . For OLS with R 2 as the objective and an intercept, and when the intercept is not a factor, Θ(∅) = 0. With log-likelihoods, typically v(S) < 0 without normalization. If v * (S) = abs[Θ(S)], v * is not monotonic and results are useless. Also, likelihood (e.g., v * (S) = exp[Θ(S)]) is not a substitute for log-likelihood because it is not used in significance tests.
Attribution shares, and not magnitudes or differences, are the essential information. It may be difficult to properly determine the null likelihood for some models.
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In such cases, linear attribution shares cannot usefully be defined because they are a function of Θ(∅). PMA shares, however, are invariant to changes in Θ(∅), so long as monotonicity is maintained, because in the dual game to v the worths of all S N are invariant to changes in Θ(∅). Changes in the dual worth w(N ) only scale PMA components. These relationships are consequences of Lemma 2.2. OLS R 2 attributions sum to the R 2 of the model, but can be normalized to sum to 100%. R 2 -like measures that indicate the relative explanatory power of some maximum likelihood models have been constructed (see Maddala (1983) , Section 2.11).
Fair's (1978) infidelity study
Econometric attribution is studied here in the context of Fair's (1978) Table 2 : Reanalysis of Fair (1978) . Independent variable: frequency of infidelity.
The response variable studied by Fair is the self-reported frequency of infidelity. The explanatory factors include the respondent's sex, age, education and occupation, the number of years married, whether the respondent has children and the respondent's (self reported) level of religious belief and marital happiness. Table 3 : Data from Fair (1978) . Independent variable: Self-rated marital happiness. Greene (2003) discusses the expected relationships. OLS and probit t-statistics are similar. Poisson factor t-statistics are considerably higher. Age and happiness reduce infidelity, but years married increases it.
PMA, LA and statistical significance rankings are identical in this case. CVD consistently finds year married about twice as important as PMA or LA. CVD also finds years married more important than happiness in the Poisson regression. Model choice, in this case, affects coefficients and their precision, but has little effect on LA, PMA or the relative magnitudes of t-statistics. Note that LA and PMA give identical results when factors are uncorrelated. CVD results then also agree for OLS.
The negative CVD components for age in all models are problematic and causes the high CVD importance of years married. When age is removed from the OLS model of infidelity the CVD relative importance of years married falls to 25%, and that of happiness rises to 53%, similar to PMA and LA results. Table 3 shows OLS and ordered probit models of marital happiness. Estimated coefficients of both models are similar, the except probit estimate of the effect of having children is almost 30% larger, and the PMA component is almost 50% larger. The increase in the LA component is just above 15%. Explained variance is proportional to the square of the beta in uncorrelated OLS, which would imply a 69% increase.
For the OLS and ordered probit models of marital happiness, all attribution methods indicate years married is most important. The bootstrap probability that PMA years married is larger (more important) than PMA education is greater than 85%. In contrast, t-statistics seem to show education is most precisely estimated. In practice, this result is commonly interpreted as indicating that education is most important.
Age and years married are highly correlated (ρ = .78), which degrades statistical test values. Indeed, when age is excluded the years married t-statistic becomes largest (-4.44 for OLS). Age, however, may be a valid predictor for marital happiness. If so, its exclusion from the model could bias the model and attribute its explanatory power to the factors with which it is most correlated. Also, the LA for years married rises to 51% when age is excluded, indicating the relative sensitivity of LA to model definition.
An F -test of the joint significance of sex and age in the OLS model is rejected (p=0.76). But removing age increases the magnitude of the years married beta by 22%. It would be a mistake to exclude age if the goal was to obtained unbiased coefficient estimates unless it could be maintained that age did not belong in the model in the first place. The age PMA of 4.33% signals this result.
General microeconomic models 4.1 Inert factors and utility attribution
Is random order consistency an acceptable axiom for utility attribution? Consider this question in the context of portfolio optimization. Uncorrelated assets, e.g., riskfree assets, are not inert factors: Their utility contribution is not independent of other assets. Further, an investment option of zero utility cannot be inert by definition.
The ability to define an inert factor must thus rely on a factor that is not a portfolio choice. Its utility must be independent of the portfolio. These conditions are satisfied if utility is additively separable in the investment and the inert factor.
There is no reason why two completely independent choice problems could not, in principle, be composed into a single optimization problem. This simple fact appears to allow the definition of an inert factor in almost any choice problem. Random order consistency becomes applicable once it is established the existing attribution problem could be composed with a suitable independent problem as a larger attribution. 
Portfolio attribution
Let N be a set of n assets with expected return vector µ and covariance matrix Σ. Using quadratic utility and formula (1), v(S) for any set of assets S is
where λ is the index of quadratic risk aversion, µ S , ω S and Σ S are restricted to the members of S, ω S is the portfolio allocation and ∆ S is the s − 1 dimensional simplex of nonnegative portfolio weights that sum to unity. Here U (∅) = 0. The restriction v(S) ≥ 0 allows not investing if v(S) < v(∅), as is possible when restricted to some asset combinations. If exponential utility were used, then U (S) < 0 for all S ⊆ N and the definition v(S) = U (S) − U (∅) is necessary, as in Section 3.2 for likelihoods. Table 4 reports the assets used in this example, along with their monthly mean total returns, standard deviations, Sharpe ratios and correlations for the period 1988 to 2004. 6,7 Table 5 presents the optimal portfolios for an individual with quadratic risk aversion level λ = 2, along with two sets of attributions. One is for all investment options. The other excludes corporate bonds. For each set, PMA and LA results and (discrete) marginal utility contributions are reported. All attributions are normalized to 100%. The final column of Table 5 presents the proportional marginal performance attribution (PMPA) of assets with positive portfolio allocations. The PMPA of an asset is the ratio of its PMA to its portfolio weight. 7 The Sharpe ratio is the excess return of an asset over the risk free rate divided by its standard deviation. The Sharpe ratio is a measure of excess return per unit of risk. Table 5 : Asset allocation and performance attribution when λ = 2.
Port.

With LT
The optimal portfolio monthly return and standard deviation are 0.0096 and 0.026 and its Sharpe ratio is 0.364. It is about 54% equity and 46% fixed income. The PMA is in similar proportion (56%/44%). Only assets with positive portfolio weight receive a PMA share, while every asset class receives some LA share. LA gives government and corporate bonds almost equal importance even though corporate bonds receive no portfolio weight. Marginal contributions are heavily weighted to equity because of the substitutability of government and corporate bonds.
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PMPA provides a measure of an asset's per dollar contribution to portfolio performance. The PMPA ranking is differs from the Sharpe ratio ranking. Government bonds have the highest Sharpe ratio of all allocated assets, followed by large cap equity. But Large cap equities contribute most to portfolio performance per unit of investment. The PMPA of large cap equity is more than three times the PMPA of small cap equity even though its Sharpe ratio is only 23% higher. The Sharpe ratio measures stand-alone performance, whereas PMPA evaluates performance relative to a specific portfolio. (Note, corporate bonds have the highest Sharpe ratio but receive no asset allocation.) Further, attribution is relative to a specific risk profile.
In the second set of attributions of Table 5 , corporate bonds are not an option. The PMA does not change. The LA equity share rises to 52%, but now government bonds are seen as more important than large cap equity. The relative marginal contribution of government bonds is now very high without substitution from corporate bonds, and equity marginal contribution is weak because of equity mutual correlation.
If t-bills and international equity are also removed from the choice set, the LA becomes (37%, 25%, 28%) and equity receives 62% total attribution. PMA results are unchanged. When large cap and small cap shares are aggregated, the PMA is (52%, 48%) and the LA is (53%, 47%). In all cases, PMA implies that a little over half of portfolio performance is attributable to equity and almost half to bonds. LA implications depend strongly on details of the attribution analysis.
Unutilized assets are irrelevant for PMA because of exclusion. In this example, and generally, PMA is not very sensitive to aggregation; but it is possible to construct contrary examples. Linear attribution is sensitive to both unutilized factors and factor aggregation (as in example 5.1, below). The differences between LA and PMA may be a useful measure of the substitutability of factors. PMA offers a consistent method of attributing joint effects in the creation of investment value, and thereby providing insight into its sources.
Joint cost attribution
Cost allocation has traditionally been considered a bargaining problem by game theorists. In cost attribution, the utility function of formula (1) is an aggregate cost (disutility) function. The arguments of the cost function are typically aggregate demands for products or services over cost centers. The applicability of random order consistency to cost attribution raises the same types of issues as considered for utility attribution in Section 4.1. The potential existence of an inert cost center is no different the potential existence of an inert factor in a utility or econometric attribution.
Linear or proportional marginal cost attribution?
Neither inclusion nor exclusion appear obviously appropriate for cost attribution. While exclusion might seem appropriate for the attribution of profits, many might find it problematic that somebody is getting something for nothing. Exclusion in cost allocation requires that a party that imposes no final marginal cost should have no attributed cost if all other parties impose final marginal costs.
Inclusion may appear an innocuous axiom in this context, however linear cost allocation methods have not been widely adopted and were not well-received by accounting researchers. Moriarity (1975) , Banker (1981) and Gangolly (1981) explicitly support or propose proportional alternatives. Banker writes that linear attribution is "not consistent with our axioms, and hence with traditional cost allocation methods. " (1981:127) . Thomas (1977) provides examples that demonstrate the vulnerability of linear attribution to strategic definition of cost centers. 
Discussion and conclusion
This paper introduces a new expectation-based random order approach to cooperative value. Linear and proportional value are characterized in a common setting without assuming linearity or proportionality. Random order consistency, the key element of this approach, assumes only that we can see the "expectational mechanics" of the random order process, and that these mechanics do not change if invisible inert players or factors are added. These mechanics have specific interpretation regarding the relative importance of factors in the theory of attribution developed here.
Random order consistency is key to both theoretical and applied results. Contrast this with the limited power of reduced game consistency discussed in Remark 1.1. Random order consistency is strongly and uniquely associated with cooperative value.
Consider the scope of this theory if based on reduced game consistency. The use of reduced game consistency must imply some correspondence between the reduced game and the original attribution. But few, if any, properties of a game or cost function are preserved by reduction. The reliance on the dual game is also problematic. Consider an attribution problem with a vector of demands x and cost function c(y
Let w * be the game resulting from the reduction of player k, so that N * = N \k and w * (S) = w(S ∪k) − φ k (w), where φ i (w) is Sh i (w) or ϕ i (w). In general, there will be no vector of demands x * such that w * (S) = c(x * N * ) − c(x * N * \S ) for all S. Nor, in general, will there be a cost function c * such that w
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Random order consistency places minimal demands on the structure of an attribution problem. Section 4.1 proposes it appropriate for any attribution problem that can be composed with an independent attribution. The specific applications studied here demonstrate practical potential applications. PMA appears to provide theoretically sound measures of the econometric relative importance of model independent variables. These measures also appear to allow comparison of relative importance across models and to be useful diagnostics for model construction and evaluation. Feldman (2005a and applies a similar approach with financial factor models to provide variance decomposition of an asset manager's return stream to identify the relative importance of factor drivers.
The portfolio attribution example shows the considerable knowledge of data and preferences necessary for utility attribution, but, also, the potential benefit. Portfolio PMA and PMPA are new investment analysis tools and examples of practical feasible applications. They are distinctive in that they evaluate an asset's total, as opposed to marginal, performance both relative to a portfolio and an investor's risk preferences.
In this theory of attribution, linear and proportional value emerge as parallel expressions of an underlying value principle. This relative importance approach to cooperative value is developed specifically for the single-utility function attribution environment, but applies directly to TU bargaining as well. Feldman (2002) develops similar results for the more general nontransferable utility (NTU) games using ratio potentials. In this "dual" approach to value either the linear or proportional "mode" might be more appropriate for a particular application.
Game theoretic interest in proportional solutions, including the proportional value, has been hampered by the belief that they are translation dependent (see, e.g., Hart and Mas-Colell (1988: 595n) ). Real allocations seem to change with affine translation of a player's utility function. This outcome should arouse scrutiny as it implies the incoherence of a basic distributive principle recognized at least since Aristotle.
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The apparent translation dependence of proportional solutions results from a missing element in the standard NTU cooperative game. The basis point, a vector of utilities, one for each player, allows determination of the marginal utility to any player of any bargaining outcome. Feldman (2005b) demonstrates the existence of the basis point and shows that proportional solutions are translation invariant when a player's basis utility and utility function are subjected to the same affine transformation.
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This theory of attribution is based on a single decision maker and, hence, would be unaffected even if proportional bargaining solutions were translation dependent.
Examples presented here clearly demonstrate the relevance of the basis point in attribution problems. Section 3.2 shows that econometric attributions are not uniquely defined unless the null model objective function value can be defined and used as the basis point. (Interestingly, PMA shares are invariant to the choice of the basis point.) Similarly, Section 4.2 shows that utility attribution must specifically define null model utility for utility functions where null model utility is not zero.
11 Young (1994: 64) writes " [p] roportionality is deeply rooted in law and custom as a norm of distributed justice." Moulin (1999) starts by quoting Aristotle: "Equals should be treated equally, and unequals, unequally in proportion to relevant similarities and differences."
12 Recognition of the basis point implies intrapersonal but not interpersonal comparison of utility.
Finally, researching the accounting literature, I was often surprised by the intensity of the arguments against linear cost allocation, and sometimes by the palpable frustration. Thomas (1977: 43) , in his study of cost allocation and transfer pricing, chooses the following epigraph (from Lousia M. Alcott's Jack and Jill) for his chapter on cost allocation using the Shapley value: ". . . Molly retired to wet her pillow with a few remorseful tears, and to fall asleep, wondering if real missionaries ever killed their pupils in the process of conversion." Neutrality between linear and proportional methods is theoretically sound and evolutionarily wise.
Proofs
7.1 Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 1.1
Proof: I. First consider multiplicative likelihoods. Endogenous random order consistency requires that functions of the worths of factor sets including an inert factor factor out of the sum of likelihoods generated by a suborder. The terms in Set of sets S * helps to form a common denominator for multiplicative likelihoods. For any r i 0 ∈ R * , let R * i be the factor sets that are included in r
whereL is a partial likelihood withL i = l −1
i . For every j < n there are two sets in S * with j factors. Only one of these factor sets is in any T * i . These are S Induction is used to sum likelihoods. Assume that l i (S) = w(S) −1 for all i < j and that the following pattern holds for sums of the first j − 1 orders in R * : , where w 0 is the dual game generated by N \z and p ⋄ is the distribution induced by L ⋄ . Thus, L ⋄ is random order consistent between games of cardinality n − 1 and n for any n > 2. Consistency between games of cardinality m > 2 and n is established by repeat reduction of individual inert factors. L ⋄ is random order consistent.
Any L ′ = c L ⋄ , where c > 0, is also random order consistent, but still generates p
⋄ . An L ′ created by dropping any l i or combination of l i is not random order consistent because the zipper will fail. The only way that the terms that depend on allS z can be factored out of the sum r⊃r 0 L(r) is by combining terms using the relationship l i (S i ) + l 1 (S Proof: Select any r ∈ R(N \ī) and let r j ∈ R(N ), j = 1, . . . , n be the order created by inserting i at position j, so that r 
